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Graydon: And This, Too, O King, Shall Change and Pass Away

"AND THIS, TOO, 0 KING, SHALL CHANGE
AND PASS AWAY"
C. T. GRAYD0N*
It might be well, before I get into the subject, to define my
conception of the terms with which the country is most concerned today. We hear most often the words "reactionary,"
"conservative," "liberal," and "radical". To my mind a reactionary is a man who never wishes to change except to go
backwards. He is afraid of change and wants to hold the status
quo or even to recede. A conservative is a person who is willing
for change under certain limited conditions but who has to
be thoroughly convinced before even attempting a change
that the same is in line with his philosophical thought and
will not upset the status quo. A liberal is a person who is not
only willing to change, but is ready and anxious to change,
provided, however, that he is convinced, or has reasonable
grounds to conclude, that the change might work for better.
He is willing to experiment, to try out new ideas and to break
with the past where the change apparently betokens good for
the future. A radical just wants change. It makes no difference to him whether the change is good or bad. He wants to
try out new ideas, new thoughts and new theories without
any consideration as to the effect upon the country. He is
willing to upset any established rule or law just to try something different. He is often not concerned with the effect
of the change but wants to tear down the existing order in
the hope, if not always in the belief, that things will be better or at least different.
A story is told that in ancient Asia there was a kingdomthe most powerful in the world; it had lasted for centuries,
its armies were the greatest in the world, its resources were
unlimited and its power was unmeasured. The ruler of that
country thought that his kingdom.would last forever and he
wanted a motto which would always be true and always applicable-as stable as his kingdom. He sent out the ten wisest
men in the kingdom to get this eternal truth as a motto for his
everlasting empire. For ten years the wise men sought in vain
*Member South Carolina Bar, Columbia, S. C. Vice-Preldent South Carolina Bar
Association.
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for such a motto and finally came and announced that they
had at last found something which was true then and would
be forever true. And in the guilded palace, amid the show of
pomp and power and the armed might of the kingdom, the
chief wise man arose and stated, "0 King, we have at last
found something which is forever true-a motto of eternal
truth," and waving his hands about, pointing to the splendor
of the kingdom, to the might of the nation, to the glory of
the empire, the wise man said, "And this, too, 0 King, shall
change and pass away."
And so it is in life-the only truth which is eternal is that
there will forever be change.
Our nation has been subject to change, and fortunately
those changes have made us a stronger and more virile nation. It is about those changes in the law as laid down by
our United States Supreme Court that this article is written.
When the United States Supreme Court ended its term in
the spring of 1937, an era in the judicial thinking of our nation came to a close. For almost one hundred years the highest tribunal of our land, in large measure, stuck doggedly,
though not always with consistent reasoning, to the doctrine
of stare decisis. The decisions abounded in references to other
cases, sometimes not applicable; precedent was the watchword.
But upon what precedent were these decisions of the United
States Supreme Court based? Largely on cases which had
been decided by a single man: John Marshall. The court, after
Marshall's death, regarded as sacrosanct the many opinions
which he had written by bold jaunts into fields in which there
had been no law before he spoke. On great constitutional questions which were without precedent, Marshall interpreted this
document as he saw fit-somewhat, of course, in the light of
his knowledge of the constitutional convention.
And when the court began to depart from the so-called established law in the middle of 1937, a howl went up from the
bar, the judiciary and vested interests that the Constitution
was dead. Many lawyers said that they could no longer safely
advise clients, and that no one could know whether or not
he was violating the law when the interpretation of the law
was to be established without precedent or logic.
Frank J. Hogan, the President of the American Bar Association in 1939, in speaking of the changed court, said:
* * Reliance against the exercise of arbitrary
"*
power must be placed by the people henceforth in the
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legislative, rather than in the judicial department of the
national government. Legislative independence and legislative wisdom are now America's almost sQle reliance
for the continuance of that security of the blessings of
liberty for which the Constitution was framed and the
Government of the United States created."
But actually it has -always been thus, for it was John Marshall who in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824), had
declared:
"The wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity
with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are in this as in many other instances the sole restraints on which they have relied to
secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on
Which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments."
We hear, from time to time, lawyers and others refer to the
Supreme Court as the great bulwark of our liberties, but I
think that this is an exaggeration. Instead of being a bulwark, I think that in many instances .the court-as it was
formerly constituted-has thwarted the attempt of the people to obtain rights and liberties which were due them under
our form of government and retarded democratic progress.
But the court was for many years exactly what John Marshall intended that it should be: the defender of entrenched
wealth against the onrush of the democrAtic mass of the people. Perhaps this concentration of wealth and economic policy
of status quo allowed our country to expand to its present
greatness; that is not for me to say. But I think that a
healthier system is to allow the people to try out various plans
and methods through legislation-as was done in the case of
the National Labor Relations Act, and let the people correct
any mistakes which have been made-as has actually been
done in this case through the enactment of certain provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Bill.
Thus, for more than a hundred years the court followed almost blindly the principles which John Marshall had laid down.
While. I do not subscribe to his beliefs, nor do I consider
Marshall a great jurist in the common accepted sense of that
term (he was not an erudite lawyer having had little legal
education), I must admire him as an original thinker. Not
until the last decade have we had a court which was willing,
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as he did, to go into uncharted seas. Of course there have been
other original thinkers on the court since Marshall-Holmes,
Cardozo, Brandeis-to mention three within our times. But
they were always in a dissenting minority.
And so virtually for the first time within the history of
the court since Marshall's day, it becomes vastly important
not merely to examine the opinions of our court, but also the
personalities of the men who sit on the bench. The court today
will often stick to precedents, and at times invoke the principle of stare decisis-but they will not hesitate to break with
the past and write decisions which, instead of being attuned
to past opinions or doctrines, are in harmony with the times
in which we live.
It will not be possible for me to examine in detail, each of
the men who is on the present court. I can only give a general picture of the court with a few facts about each man. I
don't know how each attorney feels about the matter of handling a case before different judges, but I attribute what success I have had in the courts in large measure to an ability
to present each case as I think the judge would like to hear
it. Before some judges, lengthy arguments are desirable;
others merely want a short answer to questions which they ask.
First I will give you a general picture of the court as it is
composed at this time. There are now on this bench seven
Roosevelt appointees, the first of whom-Hugo Black-became
a member of the court in 1937; the two Truman appointees
are Burton of Ohio and the chief justice, Fred M. Vinson. No
man on the court has therefore served for more than a decade,
an unusual circumstance since the court has usually had
some veterans of many years' service on the bench. The late
chief justice, Harlan Stone, served for 21 years; Oliver Wendell Holmes for 30 years; John M. Harlan for 34 years;
Stephen. J. Field for 33 years; Roger Taney for 28 years;
Joseph Story for 34 years and John Marshall for 34 years.
In that list one of these justices was on every court between
1801 and 1946-which helps explain the regard for precedent
and the conservative continuity of the body.
But now we have a court which is relatively new in its time
on the bench-and therefore more willing to break with the
past. The average age of the present members is 57.5 years.
Three of the present members are from the east, three from
the south (two being nominally from the State of Kentucky)
and three from the midwest. They do not think along sectional
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lines, however. To attempt to divide them into conservatives
and liberals is difficult in a nation where so-called conservatives often vote, and sometimes actually become liberal, and
where the young liberal often changes into the old reactionary.
At best those terms are difficult, for I defy you to find me
the man who classifies himself as a reactionary. And there
are few in our nation who style themselves conservatives. Most,
of us think that we are the liberals.
The oldest member of the court in point of time, as we have
said, is Hugo Black. He is a strange mixture. When Roosevelt
appointed him to the court in 1937 the country was amazed.
He is a southerner of the New South. Before he became a
United States Senator from Alabama in 1927, Black had a
large and successful practice of -law and he was known
throughout his state and the south as a finished lawyer.
When he went to the Senate he soon became an expert legislator. There are many who serve within the Congress for
decades who never seem to learn anything about the business
of legislating. But Hugo Black had the mind and the ambition
to do whatever he set out to accomplish efficiently and effectively. Many corporate lawyers said tha.t he was not fit to
sit on the court, and the newspapers raised the bugaboo of
a one-time membership within the Ku Klux Klan.
A decade on the bench has established his ability and fitness
for the highest tribunal. In 1946-47 he wrote more opinions
than any other member of the court-29 decisions, 9 dissents
and one concurring opinion. Here, again, he has prtven his
originality and adaptability in any job assigned him. Many of
his opinions at first were lone dissents--but they abounded
in a respect for the worth of the little man and showed a
genuine attempt on his part to bring the court "up to date".
Black joined Cardozo (whose health was waning), Brandeis,
Hughes and Stone to change the complexion of the court completely. But this was, of course, only the beginning of the revolution which was shortly to be accomplished.
Halfway through the winter of 1937-38 Sutherland, one of
the most bitter reactionaries of the old wing of the court, retired. Only 25 years before his retirement, when he was still
a Teddy Roosevelt progressive from the Rocky Mountain area,
the then Senator from Utah had this to say to the American
Bar Association of the Constitution:
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"It is not and never has been a wall, but a wide, free
flowing stream within whose ample banks every*needed
and wholesome reform may be launched and carried."
The man who was to succeed him and interpret the Constitution in the very broad way which Sutherland had suggested

long before he went on the court was Stanley Reed, Roosevelt's Solicitor General. Reed had led the government argument in cases involving the A.A.A., N.R.A. and the National
Labor Relations Act Board so that it is not surprising that

we find him saying in a concurring opinion in Erie v. Tamnpkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1937), a few months after he went on the
bench:
"In this court, stare decisis, in statutory construction,
is a useful rule, not an inexorable command * * *"
Reed is a good, sound lawyer, with much practical courtroom
experience, his many activities in governmental circles before coming onto the bench equip him well to handle the numerous administrative- and complex governmental-questions
with which the court is often faced today.
The next appointment after Reed was Felix Frankfurter, a
Hebrew, to take the place of the great Cardozo, also of the
Jewish faith. Here was a man who had served for 22 years
as a professor and theorist in the law. He was also an expert
in the field of public service, and many business men feared
him as the most dangerous member of the court when he was
first appointed. Their fears were short-lived, for this man who
had paid lip service for so many years to -liberality became, as
so often happens, a champion of the status quo when he ascended to a position of power. The theories with which he had
played in college were not to be put into effect by him; his "
opinions in the beginning were written in the high-flown
language of. the college professor, but they contained little
that was original except their verbosity and obscurity, although there has been marked improvement and he is now the
erudite and -vigorous champion of States Rights almost forgotten. He is now the court's leading dissenter, having written 18 dissents in 1946-47.
When the great Brandeis retired in 1939. the chairman of
the Securities Exchange Commission, William 0. Douglas,
then only 41, was appointed to the court. Douglas had little
trial experience when he went on the bench, most of his short
career having been devoted to the teaching of law and to the
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investigation of the Stock Exchange. His ability in this ihvestigation and as chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission convinced Roosevelt that this was a man well qualified
for the court. I think that his subsequent service on the bench
has proven the correctness of this estimate. He is next to
Black in work, actually having written more pages than the
Alabamian in the session of 1946-47.
The court's complexion was now changing fast. Butler died,
VcReynolds and Hughes retired and Stone was elevated to
the chief justiceship. The places were filled by Frank Murphy,
Robert H. Jackson and Jimmy Byrnes, the latter of whom is,
of course, no longer a member of the court.
Frank Murphy is unmarried and a staunch Catholic. He
served at one time in the office of the United States District
Attorney in Michigan, sat for a short time as Judge in a police
court and became Mayor of Detroit. He later became Governor
General of the Philippines, Governor of Michigan and, finally,
Attorney General oi the United States. Thus his career has
been largely political, rather than judicial.
Robert H. Jackson, before he became general counsel for
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was an attorney with a large
practice in Jamestown, New York. By 1936 he had risen to a
position as Assistant Attorney General, later became Solicitor
General, and like Murphy, was appointed to the court from
the office of Attorney General. His name, of course, came
into the news recently when he went to Germany to prosecute the Nazi war criminals, and there is in the minds of some
a question as to his temperamental fitness since the episode of
his ill-timed blast against Black.
Late in 1942 Byrnes resigned; he had not been in the Court
long enough to test his qualification as a member of the body,
but the few opinions which he did render showed that he, too,
was not to be hidebound by precedent, and was willing to move
with modern and enlightened thought. His place was taken by
Wiley Rutledge, who had served as a law professor at various
-western institutions for 25 years before his elevation to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in 1939.
The first Truman appointee to the Court was Harold Hitz
Burton, a conservative, who had long been prominent in republican circles in Ohio. He had served as Mayor of Cleveland,
but most of his practice was in the corporate field. He was
elected a Senator from Ohio in 1941.
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The most recent appointee to the Court was Fred M.
Vinson, a liberal Kentuckian who had served for some time on
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and in various other governmental offices, including Secretary of the
Treasury under Truman. The appointment was a most happy
one, because it came at the time of the open fight between
Jackson and Black, which had been smoldering for several
years. It was Vinson's job to reconcile the differences between
a court which was seething with personal feuds; this was the
natural result of the Roosevelt policy of placing men of highly
individualized views on the bench.
It is noteworthy that Vinson, serving his first term, was
the only member to register no dissents in the 1946-47 session. It, is also a tribute to Vinson that during his first year
feuds and dissension among the justices did not flaie into the
open, although the court was just as divided opinionwise as
ever.
Some court observers tend to give Vinson considerable credit
for the comparative calm which prevails on the high bench.
But just what Vinson did or did not do is not quite clear. The
contentious judges may have decided to resolve their own difficulties, but certainly the appointment of Vinson calmed the
rough water and made for surface peace.
As any lawyer who practices before the court today will
tell you, they are not the austere and formidable group which
sat on the bench for so many years. Each member is fully
aware of the spirit of the times. Several of them ask questions in the midst of argument; some of them often seem
slightly rude and perhaps even dictatorial in their outlook.
But it must be remembered that they have a tremendous load
to carry, particularly in this age where there are so many instrumentalities of the United States Government in the courts.
Although many have said that the Constitution is gone, the
Court still lives within the broad framework set out by the
authors of the supreme law of the land. And it is my belief
that the Court today is interpreting the Constitution in the
spirit which the members of the Convention of 1787 intended.
I think that one instance which has been constantly in the
news and in the courts for the past ten years will support this
view: I refer, as you might have anticipated, to the commerce
clause.
Too often, I think, we lawyers make a habit of going to the
decision on questions of Constitutional law without ever think-
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ing of referring to the original instrument itself. Most certainly the decisions should be consulted to guide us, but often
an examination of the original words will give us a clear and
fresh insight. That was what John Marshall had to do, and
that, in substance, is what has been done in some of the recent
decisions handed down by our court.
So let us for a moment go back to the words upon which the
federal government has based so much of its legislation: in
Article I, Section 8, Subdivision 3, we find these words:
to regu"The Congress shall have Power * :
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes * * "
To regulate commerce among the several states-only seven
words--yet on these words are hinged such far-reaching measures as the Labor-Management Relations Act, the Farm Control Program, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the act creating
the interstate commerce commission, the Pure Food and Drug
Act, the Federal Kidnapping Act and numerous other acts
promulgated under the New Deal.
It would not be possible for me in a few words to trace the
history of the commerce clause; volumes have been written
on this single sentence in our Constitution within the past ten
years alone. But I think a few illustrations will suffice to show
you how the thinking of the court has swung back and forth
on this clause.
In the case from which we have already quoted, Gibbons v.
Ogden, Marshall, in discussing the Commerce Clause, said that
commerce as contemplated by the Constitution:
"concerns more states than one * * * The genius
and character of the whole government seems to be, that
its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect
the states generally; but not to those which are completely
within a particular state, which do not affect other states,
and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government."
This sweeping interpretation of the clause as reaching all
commercial matters affecting the states generally was, of
course, to be seized on by New Deal lawyers more than 100
years later as the Constitutional basis for legislation designed
to whittle down the economic power' and wealth of the same
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type which Marshall was trying to build up. The passage was
repeated in numerous cases after Gibbons v. Ogden, but it was
not applied in the broad sweep which the language of Marshall
indicated.
The attitude of Marshall towards the Constitution is best
summed up in a sentence from the earlier case of McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819), which has also become
a classic expression of constitutional law. The great Chief
Justice in that decision declared:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution, are constitutional."
Many of you probably recognize that phrase, and it sounds
perhaps more like the utterance of a Holmes or a Cardozo
than Marshall. That is because we necessarily associate Marshall with building up the power of the Supreme Court as a
bulwark for economic wealth, while the latter judges are
generally associated with broadening the powers of the federal
government to allow the people economic liberties denied them
by corporate interests. It is a remarkable tribute to the men
who wrote the Constitution that it has, despite assertions to
the contrary and despite the attempts of many distinguished
justices in many decades-including our own-to twist it to fit
the times, remained the basic, fundamental law of the land.
Within its ample banks, a McReynolds and a Brandeis would
sit on the same court and believe in their hearts in the same
Constitution.
This, I think, is due for the most part of the elastic and
adaptable nature of the Anglo-Saxon mind and temperament
in devising means and methods of achieving freedom of the
individual and the promotion of the general welfare within the
framework of our democratic system. Many declare the virtues
of our written Constitution, and I do not deny that it is necessary under our federal form of government, but I think that
we would have achieved essentially the same measure of liberty and democratic progress even had we adopted no Constitution. I think that the fundamental liberties which are expressed in the Constitution were engraved on the hearts and
minds of our people before they were set down in written
form and would have remained with us. That a central govern-
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ment was necessary would have been realized in time.
If the interpretation of the written instrument can be
changed to meet the varying times, then it is not the exacting
and technical law which some judges have declared it to be.
It is only a general and broad pointer for our government to
follow, not indicating a narrow path or trail, but merely the
direction in which the authors believed our people would wish
to proceed.
In the so-called era of big business in this nation, from
1890 until 1930, the court took the Commerce Clause and decided that Congress did not have the power to extend the clause
to activities only indirectly engaged in interstate commerce.
The theory was that the clause applied only to commerce itself and not to production and mining and other activities
which naturally closely affected interstate commerce.
The Sugar Trust cases of 1895* limited the extension of the
Sherman Anti-trust Act, and the Hammer v. Daggenhartcase,
247 U. S. 251 (1917), held that Congress did not have the
constitutional power to regulate the interstate shipment of
goods made with child labor. The theory was that this was a
regulation of conditions in productive industry rather than an
attempt to control commerce. There were two cases in 1908
which had actually decided that some railroad activities were
not closely enough related to interstate commerce to be subject to the commerce power.
Such statutes as the Lottery Act, the Pure Food and Drugs
Act, the White Slave Act, the Motor Vehicle Theft Act and
the Animal Industries Act were upheld on the grounds that
they were concerned with the interstate commerce of prohibited commodities or persons. The court has uniformly favored such efforts at federal-state cooperation, notably, too,
in the case of laws regulating the shipment of whiskey.
By the time the New Deal came to power some of the cases
restricting the application of the Commerce Clause had been
in effect or expressly overruled, so that the principal obstacle
to the broad social and economic legislation needed so sorely
by the country in 1933 was the Daggenhartcase, supra, and
many dicta in cases dealing with reservations of powers to
the states. The balance in the scale was in favor of the doctrine which had been enunciated first in Gibbons v. Ogden.
*cf United States v. E. C. Knight Co., et al., 156 U. S. 1; United
-States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601.-Ed.
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The court, however, was not disposed to accept the changes
proposed by Mr. Roosevelt and his associates. The first decisive case was the Schecter decision,' holding the N.R.A:,
which by that time had already spent most of its usefulness,
unconstitutional. The court said that the fact that an industry
-was merely related to interstate commerce was not enough to
place the particular concern under the federal power.
The next New Deal Act to come before the court was the
2
Guffey Coal Act. The Carter coal case had been bitterly
fought, and the high point of trial came when the counsel for

the coal company, William D. Whitney, cross-examined Philip
Murray and defied the labor leader to give at least one ex.ample by name and date of a family which had been cheated
by coal weighing. After some hesitation, Mr. Murray told of
-a 16-year-old boy who in 1903 had been deprived of 40 per
cent of the weight of his coal, of how he protested and was
discharged and how his father and entire family were immediately thrown .out of their company-owned house into the
street.
"The name of the family evicted from their home without notice was Murray. The head of that family's name
was William. His son was Philip. I am the individual that
was involved."
Despite the tremendous economic crisis which was still
rocking the country and crying necessity for some kind of
concerted governmental action, the court declared the Act
unconstitutional by a 5-to-4 decision. The court used the socalled direct-indirect test.- The reasoning was that since a
.strike halts production, and the cessation of production interferes with commerce, the strike only "indirectly" affects commerce-even though it might block it completely.
The decision in the Carter case, supra, had been foreshad-owed in the decision of United States v. Butler, 277 U. S. 1
(1935), which held the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional. This case was pitched, however, on the taxation
provisions of the Constitution and the power "to promote the
general welfare". These were, of course, the decisions which
,caused Roosevelt to determine to try to increase the size of
1. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
2. 298 U. S.238 (1935).
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the court to 15 in order to effect the legislation so necessary
for the nation's recovery.
The President, of course, won, as we now know, without
having to resort to so radical a plan as appointing six additional judges. The court shifted its viewpoint before'a single
appointment was made by Roosevelt; this change resulted,
probably, from the nation-wide approval of the measures
which had been taken under the New Deal. At any rate, Justice
Roberts abandoned the position of the four judges with whom
he had agreed only a few months before.
The cases which were expressly overruled in West Coast
Hotel Case v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1936), were the Adkins3
and Morehead4 decisions, both declaring minimum wage legislation invalid-Adkins case having been handed down in 1923
with the Daggenhartcase as authority and the Morehead case
in 1936.
The real indication that a new day had been reached came
in the Jones & Laughlin case,5 which upheld the validity of
the National Labor Relations Act. The opinion spoke in terms
which even the laymen could understand, when Mr. Justice
Hughes, speaking for the court, declared, in referring to the
operations of this vast steel company:
t* * * The fact remains that the stoppage of these
operations by industrial strife would have a most serious
effect upon interstate commerce. In view of respondent's
far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the effect would
be immediate and might be catastrophic. * * * We
have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that interferences with
that comemrce must be appraised by a judgment that
does not ignore actual experience."
Thus, for the first time virtually since John Marshall's day,
the Court was to return to the criterion of actual experience
rather than judicial precedent. In the case of United States V.
Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1940), the Court was to bury once and
for all the doctrines of the Daggenhartcase; by this time, of
course, the Court had almost completely changed in personnel.
3. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1922).
4. Morehead v. People of State of N. Y., 298 U. S. 587 (1935).
5. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones-Laughlin' Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1 (1936).
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There followed, then, a host of decisions, with many of
which you are familiar, upholding various phases of the New
Deal program: Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1938), saying
that Congress had the power to regulate the amount of tobacco grown on a farm; Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U. S. 508
(1940), upholding the government's right to enter into such
projects as the TVA under their power to improve navigation
and provide for flood control; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S.
111 (1942), upholding the Wheat Control Act; the Polish Alliance6 and Southeastern Underwriters7 cases in 1944, extending the power of the federal government to the control of insurance; North American Company v. Securities & Exch. Com,mission, 327 U. S. 686 (1945), upholding the validity of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
Thus, by the end of the decade under the new cdurt, every
decision which invalidated an exercise of the Congressional
power under the commerce clause has either been overruled
or distinguished to death. Thus the erosion of time, as Mr.
Frankfurter puts it, has worn away a view which held sway
for many years.
The Commerce Clause was not recognized as a grant of authority permitting the Congress to allow interstate coinmerce
to take place on whatever terms it might consider for the wellbeing of the nation. This view, of course, recognizes the inescapable fact that in our present-day economy interstate and
intrastate aspects of American business are inseparable. Production cannot be separated from commerce. Truly ours is an
interstate economy, with each part of the nation's industry dependent upon other sections and industries. Of necessity the
Congress must be empowered to regulate in some manner this
complex economic structure,
And it is ironic, to my mind, that the trend of the court today, in its interpretation of the Constitution, follows the classic
lines set down by John Marshall. It is difficult to say how a
man would behave in an entirely different age, but I venture
to guess that, had Marshall been living in 1930-36, he would
have allied himself with the members of the status quo-for
6. Polish Nat. Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U. S.

643 (1943).
7.United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, et at.,
322 U. S. 533 (1943).
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it cannot be denied that their stand was widely believed to
have protected entrenched wealth and power.
Just as Marshall had to use imagination and ingenuity to
wrest the control of the government from the people as represented by the state governments by placing authority in a
central government at a time when communications were scant
and the power business and industrial interests had not yet
arisen, just so in the past decade the court has had to use
imagination and daring to free the people from the economic
control of Big Business and industrial combines.
The revolution in the court is now complete; there is already
a swing of the pendulum in the other direction, both in the
legislative and the judicial branches of the government. But
I do not believe that we will ever return to the hide-bound
view of stare decisis which a little more than a decade ago
infected certain members of the court to a point where they
placed this doctrine, as I see it, above the welfare of the nation
and, if you please, above a fair reading of the Constitution
itself.
To say that these men were dishonest would, of course, be
to accuse them falsely. And I do not say that the members of
the present court are beyond compare; f ar from it; they are
lacking in trial and judicial experience in some degree. But
at least they are making an honest effort to make the court a
living and vital force for progress and advancement, rather
than a millstone about the neck of the greatest nation on the
face of the earth.
Precedent is not gone. Stare decisis is not forgotten.. They,
like all other rules or procedures in law, are merely guideposts
which should and must be abandoned when justice or the national welfare demands other judicial methods for the solution of our governmental problems.
Let us not be upset about these or any other changes-let
us remember the words of the wise man of the East:
"AND THIS, TOO, 0 KING, SHALL CHANGE AND PASS
AWAY."
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